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REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLEES/CROSS-APPELLANTS
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs/AppeUees/cross-appellants, Ellen Anderson, etal. (hereinafter "Anderson"
or "Plaintiffs") submit this brief in reply to the "Reply Brief and Response on Cross-Appeal
of Defendant/Appellant and Cross-Appellee" submitted by Defendant Doms (hereinafter
"Doms5 Reply Brief). However, this brief contains additional material in response to issues
raised for the first time in Doms' Reply Brief. Doms raised new issues in violation of Rule
24(c) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. This brief first addresses Doms' response
to the issues raised on the cross-appeal by Anderson and then responds to the new issues
raised for the first time in Doms' Reply Brief.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
DOMS' ARGUMENT IN OPPOSITION TO THE POINTS RAISED
ON PLAINTIFFS' CROSS-APPEAL IGNORES THE PRIOR OPINION
OF THIS COURT WHICH STATED THAT THE FINDINGS AND
CONCLUSIONS OF THE TRIAL COURT WERE INADEQUATE.
On the cross-appeal, Anderson raised the following points:
1. Doms was not entitled to damages because he did not own the entire property.
2. Doms' election of rescission precluded a subsequent trial on damages.
3. The trial court deprived plaintiffs Anderson and Scott of benefits to which they were
entitled under the trust deed note.
4. The trial court improperly offset Doms5 damages against those owed to plaintiffs.

1

5. The court erred in concluding that the statute of limitations did not bar Doms'
counterclaim.
Brief of Appellees/Cross-Appellants at 1-2, 38-49.
Doms does not directly address the arguments raised by Anderson, rather Doms
claims that the issues should be "summarily dismissed." Doms' claim is based on bits and
pieces of trial transcripts and the trial court's orders and memorandum decisions. However,
Doms' claim ignores statements by this Court.
In its memorandum opinion in this case, this Court found several issues raised by
Plaintiffs "to be without merit." Anderson v. Doms, Case No. 920653CA Slip Op. 2 (Utah
Ct. App. Nov. 4, 1994). However, the court also noted:
Because it is possible that the trial court will order the contract
rescinded due to the lack of evidence in the record concerning prejudice, we
need not address the other claims raised. However, in the event the trial court
does not rescind the transaction, the trial court should note that its findings and
conclusions do not adequately treat the effect of the intervening conveyances
to and from Domcoy on Doms's right to pursue his counterclaim and the effect
of the default judgment entered against McCoy and the sheriff's sale of
McCoy's interest in Rossi Hills on Doms's ownership interest in the property
and any damages for breach of title warranties.
Anderson. Slip op. at 3 n.2 (emphasis added). It was in response to this statement by this
Court that Plaintiffs raised all but one of the issues presented in the cross-appeal.1
Therefore, Doms' argument ignores this Court's determination that the trial court's findings
and conclusions on these issues were inadequate. Yet, Doms persists in pressing the
inadequate findings and conclusions of the trial court.

lr

The last issue presented by Anderson, concerning the proper application of the
statute of limitations, was not mentioned by this Court in the note.
2

At the same time Doms raises these claims, he also ignores those parts of Anderson's
brief on each issue which demonstrates the inadequacy of those findings and conclusions.
For example, in response to Anderson's assertion that Doms is not entitled to an award of
damages as he owned only a one-half interest in the property, Doms cites only portions of
the trial court'sfindings/conclusionswhich he claims support the notion that Doms did own
the entire property. The trial court found on remand that the Sheriffs sale transferred the
interests of McCoy to Plaintiffs. (Order on Court's Minute Entry, at 4) However, the court
also found that McCoy had no ownership interest at the time the sheriffs deed was issued.
Id. Based on itsfindings,the trial concluded that:
The default Judgment entered against McCoy and the sheriffs sale of
McCoy's interest in Rossi Hills has no effect on Doms's ownership interest in
the property and his ability to collect damages for breach of title warranties,
because McCoy had no ownership interest in Rossi Hills when the sheriffs
sale pursuant to the default judgment against McCoy was conducted; and
plaintiffs, therefore, acquired no ownership interest in the propertyfromthe
sheriffs sale.
(Order on Court's Minute Entry at 5). This conclusion of law is contrary to the court's
Supplemental Findings and Conclusions which Doms ignores. There, the court stated, "The
undivided interest of Michael McCoy was sold at Sheriffs Sale so that only fifty percent
(50%) of the property could be tendered for rescission." The conclusion should be corrected
for the reasons set out in Anderson's opening brief.
Those reasons include the fact that the trustee held thetitleof both Doms and McCoy.
The title of the Trustee may only be acquired by: (a) a release of the Trustee's ownership,
which is accomplished by the trustee's Deed of Reconveyance or (b) foreclosure of the
Trustee's interest by either following the procedure authorized for Trustee foreclosure, or
3

by foreclosing the interest as a mortgage, which is authorized by Utah Code Ann. §57-1-34.
The beneficiaries of this Trust Deed, Anderson and Scott, elected to foreclose by proceeding
under the provisions authorizing the foreclosure of the Trust Deed in the manner provided
for foreclosure of a mortgage.
A special execution was issued, and the Sheriff conducted a sale. Subsequent to the
sale, and after expiration of the redemption period, a Sheriffs Deed was issued conveying
McCoy's undivided one-half interest in the property to Plaintiffs, the high bidders at the sale.
No redemption was made. Doms' undivided one-half interest remained in the Trustee, but
Doms had transferred and conveyed such encumbered interest to Domcoy which was then
the equitable owner Doms' interest. Further, Doms in court reviewed the Sheriff s Deed and
insisted on a correction to indicate the deed only affected McCoy's interest.
The sale and transfer by Doms and McCoy to Domcoy exhausted their right to claim
damages against Plaintiffs. The covenant against encumbrances is a personal covenant and
does not run with the land. See. ££., Beeslev v. Badger. 240 P. 458 (Utah 1925) (the
covenant against encumbrance was a personal covenant, "not running with the land." ).
In order to properly assess damages, there would have to be evidence of damages that
existed on the date of the sale to Domcoy, as this is the time when Doms would have
incurred damages resulting from the loss of value by reason of the encumbrances, not at any
subsequent time, as the measure of damages would be the loss incurred at the time of the
transfer. Doms was entitled only to one-half of the damages, if any, that are properly proven
since he was only a one-half owner. In the event of a sale of the property, he would have
been entitled to one-half of the sale proceeds and no more.
4

Subsequent transfers between or among Doms and Domcoy could only affect the onehalf interest held by Mr. Doms which was subject to the trust deed. The transfer by Doms
of his interest in the real estate could only involve his interest subject to the Trust Deed. A
grantor cannot grant an estate larger than that which is vested in him. As a result, all
transfers to or among Doms and Domcoy are subject to this limitation. The portion of the
judgment that purports to quiet title without regard to the trust deed is without supporting
evidence.
If the tax sale deed to Summit County was valid, it would have eliminated right or title
of the trustee and Domcoy. Fortunately, the tax sale was not conducted properly and
Plaintiffs, in order to protect their interest, the interest of the Trustee and the interest of
Domcoy instituted action against Summit County which resulted in a judgment to the effect
that the tax sale was invalid and that Domcoy Enterprises, Inc., was the owner of one-half
interest, subject to the Trust Deed. (R. 6896, 7069).
With respect to Point V of Anderson's brief which argues that Doms was precluded
from a trial on damages because he had unsuccessfully elected to pursue the remedy of
rescission, Doms claims that "a party has not been required to 'elect remedies'.. . since at
least the adoption of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure on January 1, 1950." Doms' Reply
Brief at 16. In support of this fallacious claim, Doms cites Smoot v. Lund, 369 P.2d 933
(Utah 1962). In fact, Doms' reliance on Smoot is misplaced. Later cases clearly explain that
Smoot merely stands for the proposition that a party may plead inconsistent theories of
recovery but that recovery may be had on only one theory. See, e.g.. Cook Associates. Inc.
v. Warnick, 664 P.2d 1161, 1168 (Utah 1983); Brigham City Sand & Gravel v. Machinery
5

Center, Inc.. 613 P.2d510, 511 (Utah 1980).
The doctrine of election of remedies is clearly recognized by both the Utah Supreme
Court and this Court. One of the best articulations of the doctrine is found in Royal
Resources. Inc. v. Gibraltar Financial Corp., 603 P.2d 793 (Utah 1979). There, the Utah
Supreme Court stated:
The doctrine of election of remedies is a technical rule of
procedure and its purpose is not to prevent recourse to any
remedy, but to prevent double redress for a single wrong. Said
doctrine presupposes a choice between inconsistent remedies,
a knowledgeable selection of one thereof, free of fraud or
imposition, and a resort to the chosen remedy evincing a
purpose to forego all others.
603 P.2d at 796 (emphasis in original, footnotes omitted). See also Angelos v. First
Interstate Bank 671 P.2d 772, 778 (Utah 1983); Palmer v. Haves. 892 P.2d 1059, 1061-62
(Utah Ct App. 1995); Langston v. McOuarrie. 741 P.2d 554, 556 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
Indeed, the resolution of Royal Resources clearly indicates the applicability of the doctrine
of election of remedies in this case. In Royal Resources the Utah Supreme Court held the
doctrine was not applicable because the defendant did not properly raise the doctrine and,
thus, waived it. Roval Resources. 603 P.2d at 796. Here, the Plaintiffs properly invoked the
doctrine but the trial court permitted Doms to pursue two inconsistent remedies. The
importance of requiring an election in a case involving rescission is particularly acute. In
such an action the party claiming rescission has the choice of repudiating the contract or
affirming the contract and seeking damages pursuant to it. But, according to Roval
Resources, once the choice is made other remedies are excluded. Here, Doms was permitted
to repudiate the contract but then, after losing the rescission case, he sought to enforce those
6

provisions of the contract which were advantageous to him. A party must either repudiate
the whole contract and seek rescission or enforce the whole contract and seek damages. To
allow a party to both repudiate a contract and seek to enforce parts of it illustrates the basic
reason which supports the doctrine of election of remedies.

See, e.g.. Barrington

Management Co. v. Draper Family Ltd. Partnership, 695 N.E.2d 135, 142 (Ind. Ct. App.
1998) ("The party rescinding the contract must repudiate the part of the contract which is
beneficial to him as well as that part of the contract which is not

He may not affirm that

part of the contract which pleases him and rescind that part which he considers
disadvantageous.") Here, Doms was wrongly permitted to repudiate the contract and yet
pursue damages under the contract., when he was unable to satisfy all of the elements
necessary for rescission.
With respect to the issues raised in Points VI and VII of the cross-appeal, that
Anderson and Scott are entitled to the benefit of the contract and that setoff was not available
to Doms, Doms does not dispute these issues but merely dismisses them as "not applicable."
However, Doms does nothing to demonstrate why these assertions by the Plaintiffs are not
applicable.
Finally, with regard to Plaintiffs Point VHI, in which Plaintiffs assert that the statute
of limitations barred all claims by Doms, Doms states that this Court disposed of the issue
in its prior opinion. Even if that is so, an appellate court may reopen an issue when it
believes that the prior decision was clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice.
Thurston v. Box Elder County. 892 P.2d 1034, 1039 (Utah 1995). That is what happened
with this issue in this case. The facts clearly illustrate that the limitations had expired before
7

Doms filed any answer and counterclaim in this case. An exhibit was presented to the trial
court and appended as Addendum 14 to Anderson's original brief, which plainly illustrates
the fact that the statute of limitations barred Doms' claims. Additionally, Doms claims to
have tendered or demanded rescission on many occasions, the record he cites does not
support this statement. All reference pages are attached as Addenda 1. Further, Doms did
not at any of the indicated times have ownership of the property because he conveyed it to
Domcoy Enterprises, Inc. on August 30,1983 [Exhibit 16]. Doms did not obtain any equity
in the property until August 28, 1988, some five years later, when he gave himself a deed
from Domcoy Enterprises, Inc. [Exhibit 10].
Because Doms refuses to acknowledge all of the prior decision of this Court and does
not adequately address the issues raised by Plaintiffs in the cross-appeal, those issues must
be decided in Plaintiffs' favor.

POINT H
THE NEW ISSUES RAISED IN DOMS' REPLY SHOULD
EITHER NOT BE ADDRESSED BY THE COURT OR
SHOULD BE RESOLVED AGAINST DOMS.
The last several pages of Doms' Reply Brief are consumed by issues which are raised
for the first time. Doms Reply Brief at 18-25. Those issues should not be addressed by this
Court. If the court chooses to review the issues, they should be decided against Doms.
A. Doms has violated the Rules of Appellate Procedure by raising issues for the first time
in his reply brief
For the first time in this appeal Doms claims in his reply brief that the trial court
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erred when it ruled that the warranty deed, trust deed and trust deed note do not constitute
a single contract; that plaintiffs were in breach; and that Doms was not in default. Neither
Doms' docketing statement nor his opening brief in this appeal alludes to this issue, much
less identifies it as an issue for resolution on appeal.2
In raising this issue, Doms has blatantly violated the Rules of Appellate Procedure as
interpreted by the courts of this state. Rule 24(c) clearly limits the contents of a reply brief
The Utah Supreme Court and this Court have long interpreted Rule 24(c) to mean that an
issue raised for the first time in a reply brief will not be considered. See State v. Brown. 853
P.2d 851, 854 n. 1 (Utah 1992); Von Hake v. Thomas. 759 P.2d 1162,1169 n.6 (Utah 1988);
Ottesonv. State. 945 P.2d 170, 171 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); Broadbent v. Board of Education
of Cache County. 910 P.2d 1274,1277 n. 4 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). This Court should simply
refuse to address the claims of error made by Doms for the first time in his reply brief.
One of the advantages Doms realizes by raising issues for the first time in his reply
brief is that this allows him to bypass the requirements of Rule 24(a)(5). This rule requires
that the proponent of a claim clearly cite the portion of the record wherein the issue was

2

This is not the only instance in which Doms demonstrates a disregard for the
Rules of Appellate Procedure. Indeed, Doms' brief violates the typeface requirements of
Rule 27(b). That rule requires that briefs prepared using a proportional typeface use a
typeface no smaller than 13 point. This brief and Anderson's opening brief use a 13point typeface. Comparison of the two briefs filed by Doms to this brief clearly illustrate
the smaller typeface used by Doms (simply compare the number of lines per page). By
using the smaller typeface, Doms has been inadvertently permitted to file over length
briefs. This is particularly egregious in light of the fact that Plaintiffs sought, but were
refused, permission to file an over length brief in the typeface required by the appellate
rules. It is ironic that presumably part of the reason for the court's denial of Plaintiffs'
motion for an over length brief was Doms opposition to the motion.
9

preserved for appeal and cite authorities which set out the standard of appellate review. In
his reply brief, Doms has met neither of these requirements. Nowhere in the brief does
Doms specifically state where this issue was preserved for appellate review. Indeed, in only
one new issue out four contained in his reply brief does Doms even attempt, albeit without
citation to authorities, to identify the appropriate standard of appellate review.
In instances in which a party on appeal has failed to adhere to the Rules of Appellate
Procedure, the appellate courts have presumed the correctness of the record and/or the
judgment. For example, in Christensen v. Munns. 812 P.2d 69, 73 (Utah Ct. App. 1991),
the appellant had, among other things, completely ignored the standard of review
requirement imposed by Rule 24(a)(5). Stating that the requirement promoted accuracy and
efficiency, this Court held that the requirement could not be ignored and, based on the
appellant's lack of compliance with the rules, assumed the correctness of the trial court's
judgment. Id, As in Christensert Doms, by raising issues for the first time in his reply brief,
has ignored the requirements of Rule 24(a)(5). As it did in Christensen, this Court should
reject the issues raised by Doms and assume the correctness of the trial court's judgment on
these issues. See also Phillips v. Hatfield. 904 P.2d 1108,1109 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); Koulis
v. Standard Oil Co.. 746 P.2d 1182, 1184 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
B. Even if the court chooses to address the claims made for the first time in Doms' reply
brief those claims are without merit and should be rejected by this Court.
1. Doms has not marshaled the evidence to support his new claims.
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In the new claims presented in Doms' reply brief, Point IV A through D, Doms claims
that the trial court erred in entering a variety of rulings with respect to the question of
whether the warranty deed, trust deed, and trust deed note constitute a single contract
whether Doms was excused from performance and not in default under the documents.
Doms' Reply Brief at 18-24. In each instance, Doms challenges a ruling by the trial court.
In one instance out of four contained in his reply brief, Doms asserts that the rulings were
only conclusions and therefore, should be shown no deference on appeal. Doms' Reply
Brief at 22. In the other instances, the source of the disputed rulings is unclear. Indeed, in
at least one instance, Doms fails to identify the source of one of the disputed rulings as the
trial court's findings of fact. Specifically, in Point IV C, Doms claims that the trial court
erred when it found that he was in default. However, Doms fails to inform the court that the
trial court found in its Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that Doms was
in default. The trial court found:
10....
h. Doms was in default; therefore, could not invoke the doctrine
of rescission.
13. The trust deed required the defendants and each of them to pay the
accruing taxes on the Property and the defendants failed to pay the taxes for
the years 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, and 1986.
14. The defendants and each of them were in substantial default under the
provisions of the Trust Deed as they failed to pay the required real estate taxes
which resulted in the sale of the Property to Summit County on May 27,1987.
18. The defendants and each of them were in default as the payments required
by the Promissory Note to be made after September, 1984, were not paid, nor
were the taxes paid.
(Addendum 10 to Brief of Appellees/Cross-Appellants).

11

For the most part, Doms1 new claims concerning the trial court's rulings on the unity
of the documents and whether Doms was in default are attacks on the sufficiency of the
findings of the trial court. However, the findings set forth above and others which have not
been set out here which form the basis for the trial court's conclusions are not even
mentioned in Domsf brief. Doms1 failure to confront these critical findings means that he has
also not demonstrated them to be clearly erroneous by marshaling the evidence which
support them and showing that the evidence is insufficient.
This Court has stated that failure of an appellant to marshal the supporting evidence
or presentation of merely contradictory evidence is an adequate basis for affirming the trial
court. West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co.. 818P.2d 1311, 1313 (Utah App. 1991). On
that basis, this Court should affirm the trial court's rulings on the unity of the documents and
Doms' default.
The findings set forth by the court in its Supplemental Findings and Conclusions are
sufficient. This Court has previously stated that if findings are so inadequate that they
cannot be meaningfully challenged as factual determinations, the appellant is relieved of his
duty to marshal the evidence in an attack on the findings. Woodward v. Fazzio. 823 P.2d
474,477 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). The court however then stated that findings in that case were
inadequate because they provided "no insight into the evidentiary basis for the trial court's
decision and render appellate review unfeasible." Woodward. 823 P.2d at 478. Despite
Doms? claims, the findings provide insight into the evidentiary basis for the trial court's
decision and render effective review possible.
In short, Doms* failure to marshal the evidence to support his attack on the findings
12

should, in and of itself, be a sufficient basis for this Court to affirm the plaintiffs position
on the new issues raised in Doms' reply brief.
2. The warranty deed, trust deed, and trust deed note constituted separate contracts.
Even if this Court overlooks the numerous procedural deficiencies in the new issues
raised in Doms' reply brief, Doms should not prevail. Doms contends that the trial court
erroneously ruled that the warranty deed, trust deed, and trust deed note did not constitute
a single contract or transaction. Furthermore, Doms complains that this led to the court's
ruling that Doms was not excused from performance under the trust deed and trust deed note
because of his default under those instruments. In addition, Doms asserts that (1) Plaintiffs
breached the warranty deed when they conveyed Rossi Hills with the encumbrances and title
defects; (2) Doms was subsequently excused from performance regarding the entire
transaction because of the Plaintiffs' breach of the covenant in the warranty deed and, (3)
therefore, Doms was not in default under the trust deed and trust deed note. Doms1 claims
on these issues ignore findings of fact made by the trial court and case law and therefore
should be rejected.
The trial court found that the warranty deed had been executed by all four plaintiffs
as grantors. The court also found that earnest money agreements which preceded the
warranty deed and were merged into it and were signed by only some of the parties. (R.
6877, 6885) In holding that the transactions were separate transactions, the trial court
concluded:
6.
The Warranty Deed, Trust Deed Note and Trust
Deed prepared at the same time do not constitute a single
contract.
13

7.
The Court believes that the law applicable to this
case is: The acceptance of the Deed completes the execution of
the contract, and the Deed become (sic) final and conclusive
evidence of the contract under which it is executed (84 A.L.R.
1009).
8.
The Court concludes that the Utah case of Reese
Howell Company v. Brown. 48 Utah 142, 158 P. 684, 689
(1916), set forth the controlling law which must be applied in
the instant case regarding the issue as to whether or not the
Warranty Deed, Note and Trust Deed constitutes a single
contract.
9.
The fact that a Trust Deed and Note were
executed at the same time does not make them part of the
contract to purchase the contract. The Trust Deed and Note are
documents executed to secure the payment of the property and
have no bearing upon whether the property is free and clear of
encumbrances.
(R. 6890)
The negotiations over the purchase of Rossi Hills culminated in a warranty deed
executed by the four plaintiffs in favor of both Doms and McCoy. (Exhibit 1) Mrs. Ellen
Anderson signed the warranty deed individually because she was a joint tenant of an
undivided one-half interest. Mrs. Scott signed the deed merely as a courtesy; she had no
interest in the property. Financing of the balance was accomplished by a trust deed which
included a new party, the Trustee, and the trust deed note issued by Doms and McCoy which
benefitted only two of the four grantors, Messrs. Anderson and Scott. Neither Mrs.
Anderson nor Mrs. Scott benefitted under the trust deed and note. (Exhibits 2 & 3) The
warranty deed, the trust deed and note could be considered as supplementing each other to
define all parts of the real estate acquisition. However, contrary to Doms1 claim, the
warranty deed and the trust deed and trust deed note constitute separate contracts.
In his claims that the warranty deed, the trust deed, and the trust deed note all
14

constitute a single contract, Doms cites cases and statutes which stand for the proposition
that the legal debt or obligation secured by a trust deed is part of and inseparable from the
trust deed. Doms, however, then misconstrues this body of law to mean that the trust deed
and the warranty deed must be bound together. What Doms ignores is that it is the trust deed
note which is the legal debt secured by the trust deed. The trust deed note, not the warranty
deed, is the inseparable companion of the trust deed. If the trust deed and the trust deed note
are considered one transaction, as the trial court held, the requirements of all of the cases
cited by Doms on this issue are met and the tortured interpretation set forth by Doms can be
discarded. The correct interpretation thus leaves the trust deed and trust deed note as one
contract and the warranty deed as another, separate contract, as the trial court held.
In Bullfrog Marina. Inc. v. Lentz. 501 P.2d 266 (Utah 1972), the Utah Supreme Court
set forth the criteria that should be used to determine when two or more contemporaneously
executed instruments should be construed together. The court stated, f,[W]here two or more
instruments are executed by the same parties contemporaneously, or at different times in the
course of the same transaction, and concern the same subject matter, they will be read and
construed together...." 501 P.2d at 271 (emphasis added). In the present case the criteria
were not met because the parties executing the warranty deed and the trust deed and note are
not the same parties and the instruments do not concern the same subject matter. The fourparty warranty deed transferred the real estate to Doms and McCoy. The trust deed and trust
deed note relate to the financing of a part of the purchase price and were executed by and
benefitted only two of the parties who executed the warranty deed.
This case is no different than one where a trust deed and trust deed note were made
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payable to a bank. The bank's right in the trust deed would not be affected by problems
involving the warranty deed and neither should the two parties who financed this operation
be involved with problems relating to the granting of the warranty deed which involved
additional parties who were not parties to the financing arrangement. The trial court
correctly ruled that the documents in this case were separate contracts.
3. Doms was not excused from performance and was in default.
Doms claims that he was excused from performance under the trust deed and the trust
deed note. This argument depends on Doms1 incorrect claim that all the documents were one
contract rather than two as held by the trial court. Doms again fails to perceive the
difference between an executory and an executed contract.
One of the contracts in this case is the warranty deed. Plaintiffs thought they were
issuing a special warranty deed and titled the deed as such. (Exhibit 1) In that case no breach
of any covenants would have occurred. However, the trial court determined that the deed
was a general warranty deed. Plaintiffs do not dispute that finding but nevertheless, the
cause of action in Doms arises by reason of the covenant against encumbrances in the
warranty deed. A violation of the covenant could give rise to damages unless such action is
barred by the statute of limitations. However, because the warranty deed was a separate
contract, breach of that contract would not excuse performance under the separate and
distinct trust deed/trust deed note. Doms and McCoy failed to pay the note in accordance
with its terms and this constituted a separate breach. Even if the court determined that Doms
was excused from payment, Doms also failed to pay the taxes and this constituted yet
another breach by Doms which is not excused. Failure to pay the taxes was a continuing
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default under the provisions of the trust deed and resulted in the sale of the property to
Summit County. Both Doms and McCoy were in continuous, unexcused default for several
years.
Doms alleges that failure of consideration is a complete defense and relieves the
nonbreaching party from performance. But in this case Doms and McCoy received a deed
which was the full consideration. Further, the trial court found, based on the evidence, that
Doms knew the properties were subject to certain encumbrances and rights of way before he
consummated the transaction. (R. 6882-83) The status of the property was known to Doms,
who got what he paid for, and there is no failure of consideration.
Doms cites Sprague v. Bovles Brothers Drilling Co.. 294 P.2d 689 (Utah 1956) to
support his claim that he is excused from performance because of the existence of the
easement. However, Sprague relates to executory contracts, not executed contracts. This
is not a case where the four grantors were receiving payment from Doms under a contract
to convey the property. To the contrary, the grantors had conveyed the property to Doms
and were not entitled to any further consideration for the transfer of the property. Two of
the parties had financed a portion of the sales price, but the amounts due under that contract
are entirely separate from the amounts involved in the purchase contract.
4. Doms was aware of plaintiffs breach before he purchased the property.
In Point IVB of his Reply Brief, Doms argues that the statutory covenants contained
in the warranty deed were breached by plaintiffs upon delivery of the warranty deed. Doms
Reply Brief at 21. What Doms does not acknowledge is that the trial court found that he
knew of the encumbrances, which constituted the alleged breach, before he purchased the
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property. The trial court specifically found that Doms knew that "there were roads and sheds
on the property." (R. 6883). The court also found that Doms had "actual notice of the
easement encroachments between October 22, 1981 and November 7, 1981." (R. 6883).
Finally, the trial court found that Doms "knew or should have known at the time he
purchased the Rossi Hills Property and the Slipper Parcel that the integrated development
of the three parcels had failed. . .." (R. 6882).
These findings by the trial court all illustrate that Doms was aware of any "breach"
of the covenants contained in the warranty deed before delivery of the warranty deed.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth in this brief and their initial brief, plaintiffs request that that
portion of the judgment of the trial court which denied Doms' claim of rescission and denied
Doms' attorney fees be affirmed, but that the portion of the trial court's judgment which
awarded Doms damages based on his counterclaim be reversed, and that the case be
remanded to the trial court for dismissal of Doms' counterclaim, and entry of judgment in
favor of the plaintiffs, including an award of all requested attorneys fees. Finally, plaintiffs
request that those portions of Doms' Reply Brief which present new material be rejected due
to the procedural irregularities and substantive inadequacy.
DATED this / / ( l a y of November, 1998.
Respectfully submitted,

(—4hft £/«<&< \—
^ * -"^Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellees/Cross-Appellants
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ADDENDA NO. 1

THOSE PEOPLE IF WE WERE GOING TO MAKE THE PROPERTY
USABLE,

OR SOMETHING

WOULD HAVE

TO BE

DONE;

BUT

THAT

IN

ITS CURRENT STATE, IT WAS MY OPINION, THAT THERE
WASN'T-- THERE WASN'T ENOUGH LAND AREA TO DO ANYTHING
WITH IT WITHOUT RESOLVING THE INTERESTS OF THOSE
NEIGHBORS.
Q.

ALL RIGHT.

AND DO YOU RECALL WHEN YOU

SUBSEQUENTLY ADVISED YOUR CLIENT OF YOUR LEGAL OPINION?
A.

I THINK IT WAS IN JANUARY OF 1985.

I GOT

THE MAPS SOMETIME IN LATE DECEMBER OF '84, OR SOMETIME
IN DECEMBER OF '84, AND I THIlJK IN JANUARY OF '85 I HAD
A CONVERSATION WITH GENE AND J SAID I THINK THIS THING
IS REALLY A SERIOUS
Q.

PROBLEM.

DID YOU DISCUSS WITH YOUR CLIENT THE

POSSIBILITY OF LEGAL RESCISSION ON THE ORIGINAL
WARRANTY
A.

DEED AND CONTRACT?
WELL, HE ASKED ME WHAT HIS OPTIONS WERE.

THINK I TOLD HIM T H A T —

I

HE TOL.D ME HE STILL OWED A LOT

OF MONEY ON THE PROPERTY.

I HAD BEEN APPROACHED ABOUT

ALMOST A YEAR EARLIER IN MARCH OF '84 BY ED SWEENEY
REPRESENTING THE PEOPLE THAT THE MONEY WAS OWED TO.
Q.

WHO DID MR. SWEENEY REPRESENT?

A.

MR. SWEENEY CONTACTED ME IN EARLY MARCH OF

1S84 AND TOLD ME THAT HIS FIRM REPRESENTED THE-- I
THINK IT WAS THE ESTATE OF DEWEY ANDERSON AT THAT TIME,

007500

417

MR. WALL:

FOR THE RECORD, YOUR HONOR, WE

HAVE NO OBJECTION.
MR. BIELE:

I WOULD LIKE TO NOTE THAT ALL OF

THOSE EVENTS TOOK PLACE BEFORE-THE COURT:

RIGHT.

MR. BIELE:

-- HE HAD ANY CONTACT WITH YOU.

THE COURT:

WITH YOUR CLIENTS.

JUST SO WE

HAVE THAT FOR THE RECORD.
MR. BIELE:

BY THE WAY, THERE IS NO FIRM

BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH.
Q.

SO THAT'S GONE TOO.

(BY MR. KELLER)

ALL RIGHT.

I BELIEVE WE

WERE AT THE POINT, MR. KINGHORN, WHERE YOU SAID YOU
CONTACTED MR. SWEENEY IN, I BELIEVE YOU SAID, JANUARY
OF '85; IS THAT CORRECT?
A.

YES.

Q.

AND DID YOU HAVE A MEETING WITH THEM OR DID

YOU JUST TALK WITH HIM BY TELEPHONE?
A.

I THINK I TALKED WITH HIM ON THE TELEPHONE

FIRST AND THEN WE HAD A MEETING A COUPLE OF DAYS AFTER.
Q.

WHAT DID YOU TELL MR. SWEENEY?

A.

INITIALLY I ASKED HIM IF HE REMEMBERED THE

PROBLEM WE HAD TALKED ABOUT IN MARCH

'84.

HE AND I HAD

BEEN IN CONTACT DURING 1984 BECAUSE WE WERE PARTIES IN
LITIGATION ON SOME OTHER PARK CITY STUFF AND SO WE SAW
EACH OTHER VERY FREQUENTLY.

AND I ASKED HIM IF HE
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RECALLED THIS THING, AND THE KIND OF ISSUES THAT I WAS
CONCERNED ABOUT; TOLD HIM THAT I FINALLY HAD A SURVEY
THAT REALLY LAID IT OUT FOR US AND I WANTED TO MEET
WITH HIM AND PRESENT A PROPOSAL AND TALK WITH HIM ABOUT
IT.
Q.

ALL RIGHT.

AND DID YOU SUBSEQUENTLY HAVE

THAT MEETING?
A.

YES, I DID.

Q.

AND DO YOU KNOW WHEN THAT TOOK PLACE?

A.

MIDDLE OF JANUARY, 1985, I WENT THROUGH AND

RESEARCHED TIME RECORDS AND SO FORTH TO PUT MY
AFFIDAVITS TOGETHER, AND IT'S MORE SPECIFIC IN THERE IF
YOU WANT ME TO REFER TO THAT.
Q.

WOULD YOU REFER TO PARAGRAPH 16 IN YOUR

AFFIDAVIT, BECAUSE I WILL ASK YOU SEVERAL QUESTIONS
ABOUT-- THAT MAY REFRESH YOUR MEMORY ABOUT IT.
APPROXIMATELY MID JANUARY OF 1985 YOU MET
WITH MR. SWEENEY.

WHERE DID YOU MEET WITH HIM?

A.

I THINK IT WAS IN MY OFFICE.

Q.

NOW, AGAIN, AT THE TIME YOU MET WITH HIM,

HE TOLD YOU HE WAS REPRESENTING WHOM?
MR. BIELE:

HE WAS REPRESENTING THE ANDERSON

ESTATE.
MR. KELLER:
MR. BIELE:

ANDERSON ESTATE?
YES.
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PROPERTY AND THAT ROAD FOR A PERIOD LONG IN EXCESS OF
20 YEARS, TOLD THEM I HAD NOT SPOKEN TO THE SORENSONS,
NOT SPOKEN TO ANY OF THE PROPERTY OWNERS THAT I
BELIEVED HAD ANY VESTED INTEREST BECAUSE I DIDN'T WANT
TO CREATE IMPRESSIONS IN THEIR MINDS THAT THEY HAD
LEGAL RIGHTS THAT THEY MIGHT NOT HAVE.
I WAS NOT AWARE OF WHETHER OR NOT ANY OF
THOSE PARTIES MIGHT HAVE HAD PERMISSION, WHICH WAS THE
ONLY ELEMENT OF THE PRESCRIPTIVE RIGHTS THAT I WAS
REALLY AMBIGUOUS ABOUT.
I TOLD THEM THAT I FELT UNDER THE
CIRCUMSTANCES THAT DOMS AND MCCOY WERE ENTITLED TO HAVE
THE TRANSACTION RESCINDED, WE WERE ENTITLED TO GET ALL
OF OUR MONEY BACK, THERE WAS A CLEAR VIOLATION OF THE
WARRANTY AGAINST ENCUMBRANCES IF THESE THINGS WERE
ENFORCEABLE PROPERTY INTERESTS, PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENTS,
AND WHILE I MIGHT WORK AROUND THE PROBLEMS BY PROVIDING
SUBSTITUTE ACCESS TO THESE PEOPLE IN SOME WAY, THE
PROBLEM OF THEIR BACK YARDS AND THEIR SHEDS AND SOME OF
THESE OTHER THINGS, ACTUALLY TAKING AWAY USABLE
PROPERTIES FROM THEIR HOMES WAS A TOUGHER PROBLEM, IN
MY EXPERIENCE IN PARK CITY, THAN JUST SIMPLY TRYING TO
ESTABLISH SUBSTITUTE ACCESS WITH A ROAD, AND THAT IT
LOOKED LIKE IT COULD BE A, BIG CONTINUOUS PROBLEM.

AND

I MADE THE PROPOSAL THAT MR. DOMS AUTHORIZED ME TO MAKE
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IN LIEU OF SEEKING RESCISSION, THAT WE WOULD BE WILLING
TO NEGOTIATE AND COMPROMISE, AND IF THEY WOULD BE
WILLING TO CANCEL THE BALANCE ON THE NOTE WE WERE
WILLING TO DEED THE PROPERTY BACK.
Q.

WHAT RESPONSE DID YOU RECEIVE AT THAT TIME?

A.

AT THAT TIME I WAS CONCERNED THAT THERE WAS

A PAYMENT COMING UP AND I DIDN'T WANT TO HAVE THEM
THINK WE WERE IGNORING THE SITUATION, BUT I WAS-- BUT I
FELT I WAS ENTITLED TO ADVISE MY CLIENT WE DIDN'T HAVE
TO MAKE THE PAYMENT.
ED TOLD ME THAT-- WE WENT THERE AND WE TALKED
ABOUT IT.

I DIDN'T MAKE ANY COMMITMENTS ABOUT WHAT I

THOUGHT ABOUT IT, A PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT OR ANYTHING
OF THAT KIND.

HE DID TELL ME THAT HE WOULD GET BACK TO

ME ABOUT IT.
Q.

NOW THE PAYMENT, MR. KINGHORN-- I'M SORRY.

A.

I BELIEVE AT THAT TIME HE TOLD ME THAT HE

WOULD GET BACK TO ME ON WHETHER OR NOT WE WOULD HAVE TO
MAKE THE PAYMENT BECAUSE, I THINK-- IF I REMEMBER
CORRECTLY, I THINK HE SAID, "JUST DON'T DO ANYTHING
MORE UNTIL I GET BACK TO YOU."
Q.

WAS THE PAYMENT YOU'RE REFERRING TO, WAS

THE $194,000 PAYMENT, THE PRINCIPAL PAYMENT, DUE
JANUARY 25TH, 1985?
A.

IS THAT CORRECT?

I BELIEVE THAT IS CORRECT.
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AND ONE ASKING A QUESTION AND I MAKE A NOTE OF THAT AND
THE OTHER ASKING THE SAME QUESTION.

JUST BECAUSE

IT'S

COMPOUNDED AND REPETITIVE DOESN'T MAKE ANY DEEPER
IMPRESSION UPON ME.

SO GO AHEAD.

MR. KELLER:

I UNDERSTAND, YOUR HONOR.

THANK

YOU.
EUGENE E. POMS
RECALLED AS A WITNESS IN BEHALF OF THE
DEFENDANT, HAVING FIRST BEEN DULY SWORN, WAS EXAMINED
AND TESTIFIED FURTHER UPON OATH AS FOLLOWS:
REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. KELLER:
Q.

MR. DOMS, WHEN DID YOU FIRST BECOME AWARE

THAT THE LOOP ROAD AND FENCES, ETCETERA, WERE
PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENTS THAT PRECLUDED YOUR IDEA OF
DEVELOPMENT OF THE ANDERSON PARCEL?
A.

IN LATE 1984, AFTER THE ALLIANCE SURVEY WAS

COMPLETED AND HAD BEEN DELIVERED TO JERRY KINGHORN.
JERRY KINGHORN HAD REVIEWED IT AND COMPLETED HIS
RESEARCH AND INFORMED ME IN HIS LEGAL OPINION THAT
THERE WERE PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENTS ON THE PROPERTY.
Q.

AND YOU ORIGINALLY PURCHASED THE PROPERTY

BY WARRANTY DEED DATED MARCH 10TH, 1982, WE HAVE
ESTABLISHED, AND MR. KINGHORN HAS TESTIFIED THAT HE
FIRST BECAME INVOLVED, APPROXIMATELY, WITH THIS PARCEL
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INCLUDE WHAT?
A.

FORMING A LEGAL OPINION BASED ON THE

DEFINITIVE KNOWLEDGE THAT WE FINALLY HAD.
Q.

AND DID HE REPORT BACK TO YOU WITH REGARD

TO HIS LEGAL OPINION THAT THESE WERE PRESCRIPTIVE
EASEMENTS THAT WOULD PRECLUDE YOUR DEVELOPMENT PLAN?
A.

YES.

Q.

WHEN DID YOU DO THAT, APPROXIMATELY?

A.

DECEMBER OF '84 OR JANUARY '85.

Q.

AND ONCE HE REPORTED THAT BACK TO YOU, WHAT

INSTRUCTIONS DID YOU GIVE HIM?
A.

TO CONTACT THE OWNERS OF THE PROPERTY, OR

THE PREVIOUS OWNERS OF THE PROPERTY, AND BEGIN TO
DISCUSS THE PROBLEM, SEE IF HE COULD WORK A SOLUTION
OUT.
Q.

AND AMONG THE SOLUTIONS YOU WOULD PROPOSE

TO THE OTHER SIDE WAS TO RESCIND THE CONTRACT, GIVE THE
PROPERTY BACK, LET THEM KEEP THE MONEY YOU PAID AND
WALK AWAY FROM THE TRUST DEED NOTE; IS THAT CORRECT?
A.

YES, SIR.

Q-

THAT PROPOSAL WAS MADE THE FIRST TIME IN

JANUARY OF '85; THAT IS CORRECT?
A.

I BELIEVE THAT'S RIGHT, YES.

Q.

MR. DOMS, WHY DIDN'T YOU OFFER TO THE

PLAINTIFFS IN THIS CASE TO RESCIND THIS PROPERTY PRIOR

O f,'-) r» O IT
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